court faced one of the key follow-up questions in the Indianapolis case, United States v. Board of School Commissioners:8 once unconstitutional segregation in central city schools is proved, what more must be shown to support a remedial decree embracing not just the largely black city but the nearly all-white suburbs as well?
In both cases the court labored in the shadows of prior United States Supreme Court rulings. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Denver schools case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, 9 the court of appeals in Armstrong unanimously affirmed the district court's finding, on slender evidence, that segregation in Milwaukee schools was in some measure attributable to intentionally discriminatory governmental action, and hence unconstitutional. In Board of School Commissioners, a divided court struggled in the doorway left open by Milliken v. Bradley.I 0 There the Supreme Court had barred metropolitan-wide remedies for segregation in central city schools except where an "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect is shown." 1 The Board of School Commissioners majority held that Indianapolis fit this "interdistrict" exception, apparently relying on two factors: first, a 1969 state law which in effect unified Indianapolis and its suburbs for purposes of most major government services but not schools, and second, the confinement of all public housing for family occupancy to the central city. It therefore affirmed the lower court's "limited interdistrict remedy," which ordered one-way transfer of black Indianapolis students to the suburbs and enjoined further construction of public housing in the central city. 12 Judge Tone, author of the court's opinion in the Milwaukee case and originally assigned to write the Indianapolis opinion as well, dissented. 13 It was not enough under Milliken, he argued, to show that the school district boundary and housing decisions had interdistrict "effect"; in his view their purpose also must be racially discriminatory, and the record was devoid of findings or evidence of such a purpose.14 The Indianapolis decision has been reviewed by the Supreme Court, which has vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration; and a petition for certiorari has been filed in Armstrong. 16 Apart from the substantive and procedural issues they separately raise, these two cases share the distinction of indicating the court of appeals' initial response to the Supreme Court's June 1976 ruling in Washington v. Davis ,17 a decision with potentially pervasive implications for the entire field of race discrimination law. In Davis, the Supreme Court, "with all due respect" to a host of contrary lower court decisions including three from this circuit," 8 held that "the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose" does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 19 To be unconstitutional, the law or practice "must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. "20 Will Davis be a watershed or merely force some courts to follow a different route to the same result? As the Supreme Court was careful to note and as Mr. Justice Stevens highlighted in his thoughtful concurring opinion, purpose may of course be inferred from "the totality of the relevant facts" including racially discriminatory effect, which sometimes suffices to establish a prima facie case.21 In Armstrong, the court of appeals sustained such an inference by the trial judge; Davis does not appear to have altered substantially the analysis, and to date has not altered its result. 22 In Board of School Commissioners, on the other hand, Davis has already led to a remand and may yet alter the result. Judge Tone's dissent cast Davis in a leading role. 23 Davis mattered to him not only because the district court had not attributed the school district boundary and housing decisions to racially discriminatory governmental purpose, but because in his view it could not do so on the record. 24 Perhaps the comparative judicial inexperience in assessing the types of governmental decisions attacked in Board of School Commissioners, in accepted the Solicitor General's arguments that the three-judge court had no jurisdiction to issue the remedial order and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over any appeal from the three-judge court ' contrast to the familiar local school board ploys involved in the Milwaukee case, 25 made Judge Tone less ready to infer discriminatory purpose in the absence of direct evidence. While it is clearly premature to be definitive, Armstrong and Board of School Commissioners together suggest that the court of appeals' likely reaction to Davis may in each case turn on the extent of precedent for inferring discriminatory purpose from comparable fact patterns.
Armstrong
Armstrong applies the law established in Keyes and precedent from this circuit 26 to new but not very different facts. It exemplifies how little evidence is needed for a district court properly to find a governmental purpose to discriminate, and how lenient the court of appeals will be with such a finding once made, even after Davis.
In a context of clear, system-wide statistical racial imbalance, 27 the district court found defendants' school boundary and siting decisions, busing practices, open transfer policies and faculty assignments to have contributed often slightly, sometimes considerably, to the racial imbalance, and almost never to have alleviated it. 28 From these acts having racially discriminatory effect, from ambiguous but suggestive testimony, 29 and from defendants' refusal to adopt integration proposals, 3 " the district court inferred a racially discriminatory purpose, even though defendants "always had a nondiscriminatory explanation for their acts:" 31 While the explanations 'on an isolated basis seem reasonable and at times educationally necessary,' when considered together, the acts demonstrated, the judge found, 'a consistent and deliberate policy of racial isolation and segregation ..... . . . The court found it 'hard to believe that out of all the decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions over a twenty-year period, mere chance resulted in there being almost no decision that resulted in the furthering of integration.' 3 z "Viewing all the evidence," the court of appeals concluded that the district court was "not clearly erroneous" in finding segregatory purpose. "While arguably no individual acts carried unmistakable signs of racial 25 . For example, the court characterized the "intact busing" program of the Armstrong defendants as a " 'commonly used', 'classic segregative technique.' " 539 F.2d at 635 (quoting Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 787 (6th Cir. 1974) purpose, it was not unreasonable to find a pattern clear enough to give rise to a permissible inference of segregative intent." , 3 3 Invoking the rule that it would not reverse findings of fact unless it was "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," the court tolerated instances of "unexplained hiatus between the specific findings of fact and conclusory findings of segregative intent" and accorded the district court "a presumption of consistency." 34 Plaintiffs' success to date in Armstrong may augur little outside the Milwaukee city limits. In most northern school desegregation cases, the decisive issue is whether defendants' purpose is discriminatory or racially neutral. The literal import of the court of appeals' opinion in Armstrong is that in resolving the question of purpose the district court has extremely broad leeway--either way. Even though plaintiffs in Armstrong compiled a massive amount of evidence, in the end their proof of discriminatory purpose amounted to no more than the stuff of which "permissible inferences" are made. In theory at least, another district judge could have decided this case or another one like it the other way, and in that event the court of appeals' reasoning in Armstrong would almost certainly compel affirmance of that opposite result.
If the law indeed permits such unpredictably inconsistent decisions in school desegregation cases, that state of affairs should be disconcerting to practitioners on both sides and even more so to the public, for whom momentous issues of social policy in that event turn largely on a single judge's weighing of subjective, elusive evidence. But if uncertainty reigns, Armstrong cannot be blamed. The court of appeals did no more than follow the Supreme Court's edict in Keyes that "the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation. . . is purpose or intent to segregate." 35 In a cogent concurring opinion in Keyes, Mr. Justice Powell warned that this test would lead not just to cases like Armstrong, but also to cases reaching opposite results on analogous facts. 3 6 The Keyes majority's focus on intent, he argued, is both unfair and unrealistic. It is unfair because "the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present problems of subjective intent which the courts cannot fairly resolve. " 37 The results of litigation "will be fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious"; most importantly, "[a]ny test resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a school board's segregative 'intent' provides inadequate assurance that minor- ity children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted with the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools. " 38 One might respond that courts every day are faced with problems of determining subjective intent, and that potential and actual inconsistency in the determination is an inherent imperfection in our judicial system. But in such inquiries courts are not unaided by rules which structure decisions, setting boundaries upon and establishing criteria for the exercise of discretion. Mr. Justice Powell's point in Keyes is not that intent should be abandoned as an element of the cause of action, 39 but rather that trial judges should be afforded more precise guidance, related to objective, ascertainable facts, for determining subjective intent. Specifically, he proposes "quite simply" that "[a] prima facie case of constitutional violation exists when segregation is found to a substantial degree in the schools of a particular district. "1 A demonstration of clear racial imbalance, such as that found in the Milwaukee schools, would shift the burden to the defendants to prove the segregation not purposeful. 4 1 Although Mr. Justice Powell does not so state, such a burden would be difficult to meet and the results of litigation in most cities would be uniform: plaintiffs would prevail. 4 2 But is it justifiable, in the name of uniformity of decision, to structure the rules so that one side always loses? Mr. Justice Powell's answer requires some explaining.
[S]egregated schools-wherever located-are not solely the product of the action or inaction of public school authorities. Indeed, .... ,there can be little doubt that the principal causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the major urban areas of this country, whether in the North, West, or South, are the socioeconomic influences which have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. 43 But, he adds later in his opinion, there is also not a school district in the United States, with any significant minority population, in which the school authorities-in one way or another-have not contributed in some measure to the 41. Mr. Justice Powell actually goes a bit further in Keyes. He would have the burden shift to defendants to demonstrate that they are "operating a genuinely integrated school system," by which he means one in which school officials "make and implement their customary decisions with a view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities." Id. at 224, 226. However, one need not venture so far beyond the majority's view in Keyes to utilize a prima facie rule. For example, as the text suggests, the burden, once shifted, might simply require defendants to demonstrate that their actions were not purposefully segregatory.
42. This certainly seems to be the result Mr. degree of segregation which still prevails. Instead of recognizing the reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school districts throughout the country, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality operates unfairly on local communities in one section of the country [the South] and on minority children in the others. 44 In other words, under a "purpose" test defendants are doomed to lose in the South, where a recent history of openly purposeful segregation is easily proved, while some Northern defendants, equally culpable for present segregation, may be let off the hook by evidentiary accident. Mr. Justice Powell's prima facie case rule would keep the Northerners on the hook too.
But his predictions of arbitrary inconsistency, defensible enough in theory, have apparently not come to pass in cases applying the Keyes test. Indeed, the prima facie case rule he advocated in Keyes may already have been implicitly adopted by the lower federal courts. Despite their discretion to refuse to find segregatory intent, district judges have generally inferred it from facts like those in Armstrong in suits in Boston, 45 Brooklyn,46 Detroit , 47 Denver, 48 and elsewhere, 4 9 as well as in the Milwaukee and Indianapolis cases reviewed here. Thus Armstrong may be an exemplar of the "new prima facie case": if a city's public schools are substantially racially imbalanced, and if the effect of school siting, boundary, busing, faculty assignment policies and the like has been in some measure to contribute to this imbalance, 44 then a prima facie case of segregatory purpose on the part of responsible officials is established. The burden shifts to defendants to prove that their purposes were non-discriminatory.
But if this is the de facto rule of decision in these cases, it should be formalized to avoid the fluke, but potentially unfair and disruptive, possibility that some city-perhaps Chicago-could have its desegregation case decided by a judge who rejects the pattern of decisions elsewhere and refuses to find segregatory purpose on facts like those in Armstrong.5 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has already formalized such a rule, holding that ''a presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable consequences of which is to bring about or maintain segregation. "51
Moreover, experience in these cases reinforces Mr. Justice Powell's argument in Keyes that the prima facie case rule should be streamlined even further. Since racial segregation in schools has been consistently found attributable in significant part to actions by school officials, 52 courts can fairly dispense with the requirement that plaintiffs, to prove causation, amass 50. It is debatable whether the Grand Rapids, Michigan case is such a fluke. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974). The district court's findings for defendants were accepted as not "clearly erroneous" and were also concurred in by the court of appeals, despite evidence of purposeful segregation. 508 F.2d at 783, 797. The clearest evidence of purpose was in the faculty assignment, which the district court found had been on a racially discriminatory basis; but this was not a "substantial or significant contributing cause of school segregation." Id. at 783, 788. In addition, there were a "few instances of changes of boundary lines and feeder patterns," id. at 786, and defendants had abandoned their voluntary integration plan, after first shaping it to prevent "white flight," by closing black schools and integrating blacks into white schools, not the other way around. Id. at 789, 793-95.
On the other hand, Higgins is so distinguishable from cases like Armstrong that its result might be the same even under the prima facie rule suggested in the text. First, the degree of racial segregation in schools, regardless of its cause, was less in Grand Rapids than in Milwaukee; indeed, less than in Knoxville, Tennessee, which the same court of appeals had recently found to have attained "a unitary system after earlier court-ordered desegregation." Id. at 787 (citing Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973) ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974). More importantly, such racial balance as did exist in Grand Rapids was largely attributable to the Board of Education's voluntary integration plan which, despite its shortcomings, clearly impressed the court with the board's good faith and which contrasted sharply with the recalcitrance of school officials in Milwaukee. Id. at 787, 794, 795. In addition, "many of the more commonly used or classic segregative techniques found in other cases were absent in Grand Rapids." Id. at 787. These last two factors might, in context, suffice to rebut the prima facie inference of discrimination, which itself is less forceful than in other cases because here there was less segregation.
Nonetheless, while these distinctions make the Grand Rapids board less culpable than others, it is difficult entirely to exculpate school officials from the segregation and, as Justice Powell suggests, too much should not be made of distinctions in the degree of fault in contributing to school segregation. If the Grand Rapids case bears a lesson for school officials, it is that an ounce of voluntary desegregation now may prevent a pound of court-ordered desegregation later. evidence of myriad siting, busing, pupil-transfer and other decisions by local officials. Instead, the prima facie case should be deemed made whenever plaintiffs prove a substantial degree of racial segregation in a school system. Such a rule would place the burden of adducing evidence about their past decisions on defendants, the party with more ready access to this evidence. This allocation of burdens would not only be fair to the parties, but might promote more efficient and expeditious litigation by minimizing discovery and introduction of evidence.
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Board of School Commissioners
The remedial decree in Board of School Commissioners, which provides for transferring Indianapolis students across district lines into suburban districts, is arguably not "interdistrict" in the Milliken sense. The transfer of students is within the area which, but for assertedly discriminatory acts by the state, would have been a single, metropolitan-wide school district. If Milliken is nonetheless regarded as controlling, the Indianapolis case presents the issue of what constitutes an "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect" under Milliken, 54 sufficient to authorize a metropolitan-wide, interdistrict remedy for segregation in central city schools.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Board of School Commissioners purported to address this general issue directly. Instead, both opinions focused on an aspect of the question: must the government actions which constitute the interdistrict violation, and which have interdistrict effect, also have a segregatory purpose to justify interdistrict relief under Milliken? On the Indianapolis facts, the majority seemed to say no. Judge Tone disagreed and dissented, perceiving no evidence or findings of segregatory purpose in the school district boundary and housing site decisions claimed as interdistrict violations. The Supreme Court, in its subsequent order of remand, has implied that a finding of segregatory purpose is a necessary predicate for the student transfer orders, while leaving open the possibility that such a finding can properly be made, either on this record or on the basis of further proceedings. (1975) . The connection between school segregation and purposeful state action, as argued in the text, is at least rational. Arguably, it meets even the more stringent standard for legislative presumptions in criminal statutes, which are valid only if "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 34 (1969 In earlier phases of this litigation the central city school board had been found culpable of purposeful segregation by the district court in 1971,56 and the court of appeals had affirmed this ruling in 1973. 57 The district court had then ordered a "broad interdistrict remedy" 58 after finding that desegregation within the central city would only lead to resegregation by provoking white flight to the suburbs, and that the State of Indiana, with power over suburban school districts, had participated in the central city segregation. 5 9 On appeal, the central city portion of the remedy and the findings against the state were affirmed. But the portion of the order involving suburbs outside the boundaries of the metropolitan governmental unit known as "Uni-Gov" was reversed, while that involving suburbs within "Uni-Gov" was remanded for further proceedings in light of Milliken, which the Supreme Court had just decided. 6°O n remand, the district court ordered a "limited interdistrict remedy" involving the one-way transfer of black Indianapolis students in grades one through nine to suburbs within "Uni-Gov," in such numbers that within two years all but two suburban school districts would become fifteen percent black in total enrollment . 6 1 To support this remedy, the district court apparently relied on three factors. 62 First was the "Uni-Gov" act passed by the Indiana The Indianapolis school board raised in its petition for certiorari some interesting questions not raised by the other petitioners, and not addressed by the court of appeals, about the procedures used by the district court in issuing the remedial order, and about the order's unfairness toward blacks, the central city school district, city residents and city teachers. The questions are important in this case and could become important nationwide if the resolution of the threshold issues discussed in this article leads to metropolitan-wide remedies in other cities. Among these questions were: (1) whether the court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction or improperly exercised its equitable powers by issuing the order without giving school districts and other affected parties opportunity to present alternative plans, "without hearing and determining feasibility and propriety thereof," without making findings required by 20 U.S.C. § § 1713 and 1755, and without providing opportunity for community participation in development of voluntary remedial plan as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1758, Petition for Certiorari, United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 45 U.S.L.W. 3372, 3-372 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976); (2) whether it was proper to order "solely involuntary transfer of black students to school systems of which their parents are not voting constituents, without any corresponding requirement for transfer of white students and without any conditions to assure that educational opportunities offered transferred black students will be thereby improved," id.; (3) whether the order improperly "financially burdens and discriminates against city school system by requiring payments under state law to suburban school systems in excess of their increased costs attributable to transferred students," id. at 3372-73; and (4) whether the order was proper even though it "necessarily will require closing of substantial number of city school facilities without proof of their inferiority and dismissal of substantial number of teachers and staff without requiring employment of any additional staff by suburban schools?" Id. at 3373.
62. See 419 F. Supp. at 182-83.
General Assembly in 1969, when the Indianapolis school desegregation suit was already pending.63 Uni-Gov transformed Marion County, within which Indianapolis and ten other school districts were located, into a metropolitan government responsible for most government services, including police and fire services. Some services were excluded, most conspicuously among them schools. 64 In addition, within Uni-Gov there remained three "excluded cities," which retained their own local governments while receiving some services from Uni-Gov. 65 The district court found that by excluding schools from Uni-Gov, the Indiana legislature "signaled its lack of concern with the whole problem and thus inhibited desegregation [of the Indianapolis Public School District].'' 66 Its order transferring Indianapolis black students involved only school districts within Uni-Gov. 67 Second, the district court apparently relied on the fact that the eleven public housing projects for family occupancy in the Indianapolis area, all predominantly black, had all been sited within the boundaries of the central city school district, including six on or near the district boundary. 68 The district court found that these siting decisions "obviously tended to cause and to perpetuate the segregation of black pupils in [Indianapolis Public School District] territory.' '69 In addition to grounding the pupil transfer orders partly on this finding, it separately enjoined the housing authority from building any future public housing projects within the boundaries of the central city school district. 7 0 63. Id. at 183. For a discussion of Uni-Gov, see 541 F.2d at 1214, 1215-16, 1220-22. The court noted: "It must be kept in mind that at this time both the General Assembly and the suburban school districts knew that this action was pending in the district court." Id. at 1220. 64. Id. at 1216. Other excluded functions were "[f]or example, the airport authority, the county courts, the building authority, and the hospital corporation." Id. School services stand out as exceptional among these excluded services because of the federal suit involving schools which was then pending, the greater threat of desegregation orders affecting large numbers of suburban residents posed by a metropolitan-wide school district, and the contemporaneous repeal of a prior Indiana statute which had required school district boundaries to expand with those of a city annexing its suburbs. Indianapolis was considering annexation if Uni-Gov did not pass, and the court referred to the duo of Uni-Gov and the annexation repeal statute as "fail-safe" measures designed to keep the Indianapolis school district from expanding to include suburbs. Id. at 1220.
65. Id. at 1216. The cities are Speedway, Perry and Lawrence. 66. 419 F. Supp. at 183. 67. Id. Students were ordered transferred only to the eight most white of the ten suburban school districts within Uni-Gov. All eight appealed to the court of appeals, 541 F.2d at 1215, and five of the eight, including the three districts corresponding to the "excluded cities" under Uni-Gov, then appealed to, or petitioned for certiorari to, the United States Supreme Court.
68. 419 F. Supp. at 182. See also 541 F.2d at 1216. Before Uni-Gov, the local housing authority, which was authorized to build up to five miles outside the city limits upon agreement with suburban governments, had been uniformly jilted by the suburbs. After Uni-Gov, the authority was empowered to build without agreement in most suburbs, but still it had never done so, arguing that adequate transportation and other services did not exist. "There was evidence however, that these services could have been arranged. The district court also apparently relied on a third factor, "the customs and usages of both the officials and inhabitants" of Indianapolis suburbs "to discourage blacks from seeking to purchase or rent homes therein."71 The court of appeals, however, did not discuss or appear to rely on this factor separately from the public housing site selections.
In short, the district court found both Uni-Gov and public housing siting to have the effect of perpetuating segregation on both sides of the Indianapolis Public School District boundary, but did not explicitly find either to have a segregatory purpose.
The court of appeals majority affirmed, holding that a purpose to segregate was unnecessary, at least with respect to Uni-Gov. 72 Citing Brown //73 and Green v. County School Board , 7 the two major Supreme Court decisions on the affirmative obligation of school officials to desegregate once past de jure segregation is proved, the majority opined that the Indiana General Assembly, at the time it enacted Uni-Gov, "had an obligation to alleviate the segregated condition in IPS." 75 Omitting schools from Uni-Gov had violated this obligation. Considerations of tax levels and citizen participation, which perhaps underlay retention of separate school districts, "although apparently not racially motivated, cannot justify legislation that has an obvious racial segregative impact. ",76 By this, the majority may have meant that Uni-Gov, racially discriminatory in effect if not in purpose, supplied the "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect" which had been missing in Milliken. Next, however, the majority's reasoning suggested that a Milliken interdistrict violation was not really necessary to support the remedy granted below because this case was not truly interdistrict:
In this case we are dealing with a situation in which but for certain events chargeable to the state, Marion County would be either a There a statute generally reorganizing Delaware school districts had explicitly excluded Wilmington. Although the statute was found not purposefully discriminatory, it had a "pronounced racial effect" and was invalidated for lack of a "compelling state interest." 79 The three-judge district court's decision had been summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. 80 The Board of School Commissioners majority then held that the limited interdistrict remedy ordered below was proper on the basis of Uni-Gov alone. 8 ' In addition, in proceeding next to affirm the lower court's injunction with respect to public housing segregation, the court implied that the housing site selections also supported the order transferring students to suburban schools. The court first quoted findings below that public housing segregation in Indianapolis had the effect of perpetuating school segregation. Then, although the district court had not made any express findings of discriminatory purpose in the housing site selection, the court itself found such a purpose within the record, which "clearly show[ed] a 'purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing.' "82 Thus the majority attempted to bring the case within Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Milliken, quoting the language in which he had identified housing policy as one potential "interdistrict violation" which might support an interdistrict remedy. 83 Although the majority had made no finding of discriminatory purpose with respect to Uni-Gov as an interdistrict violation, clearly such a finding was necessary with respect to the housing site decisions because of Mr. Justice Stewart's use of the term "purposeful." The majority made no effort to resolve the arguable contradiction in requiring a discriminatory purpose for one sort of interdistrict violation but not for another.
Finally, the majority upheld the particular mandatory transfer orders issued by the district court. 84 Judge Tone, in dissent, did not respond to the majority's suggestion that the case was not interdistrict in the Milliken sense, except to argue that the issue was foreclosed by the court's earlier opinion which remanded the case. In his view the only question was whether Uni-Gov and the siting of public housing projects constituted "interdistrict violations" sufficient under Milliken to justify an interdistrict remedy. 86 They did not, he argued, because under Davis 87 they could not be constitutional violations unless purposefully discriminatory, and the record contained no findings or evidence of such a purpose. 88 Green concededly imposed an affirmative duty on the State of Indiana to desegregate, but only with respect to the school district within which the state had purposefully participated in racial segregationIndianapolis. 89 Evans was distinguishable because Wilmington had a history of pre-Brown segregation practiced on an interdistrict basis. Moreover, the Supreme Court's summary affirmance did not necessarily imply approval of its reasoning, which "clearly cannot stand after Washington v. Davis."90 Who has the better argument? The question is of course not easy, but in this writer's view the majority reached the correct result.
The Facts: Segregatory Purpose in Indianapolis
One route to the majority's conclusion is short and swift, and focuses on facts without need for extended legal argument. Quite simply: both the omission of schools from Uni-Gov's functions, and the exclusive choice of central-city sites for public housing, were in significant part racially motiwarrants an interdistrict remedy within Uni-Gov in accordance with Milliken." 503 F.2d at 86 (footnotes omitted). True, this language seems to contemplate an inquiry into whether the decision to omit schools from Uni-Gov constituted an interdistrict violation with-an interdistrict effect, which is essentially the inquiry pursued in Judge Tone's dissent. But the language does not on its face clearly foreclose consideration of the present majority's argument that the entire metropolitan area would have been a single district but for Uni-Gov's omission of schools. Particularly in context, the language is ambiguous, since in the-same paragraph a clear distinction had been made between areas "beyond the Uni-Gov boundaries," as to which the original metropolitan order was reversed, and areas within Uni-Gov, as to which the order was remanded. A brief, ambiguous passage in an opinion devoted chiefly to other issues should not foreclose later de novo consideration of so important a question as whether Milliken is distinguishable, after further, proceedings and briefing, fully exploring the effect of Uni-Gov on the "interdistrict" issue. (1974) . Now, the later Evans decision, comparable in specificity to the Milliken decision given plenary review by the Court, has again been appealed, but the appeal has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See note 15 supra. Plenary review by the Court will not be likely this term, but may occur eventually.
vated. Even if Judge Tone is correct that
Milliken rigidly controls the Indianapolis case, and that the government actions constituting the "interdistrict violations" must have been purposefully discriminatory, an interdistrict remedy is appropriate here.
On the second point-the housing sites-the majority could not restrain itself from following this route. Why else were all eleven housing sites selected within the central city school district boundaries, including six on or within a few blocks of the school district boundary? Why else were two of the projects located on the Indianapolis side of a street dividing central city from suburb? Why else was one project located "in a narrow peninsula of IPS that is surrounded on three sides by Perry MSD"? 9 1 The housing authority argued that adequate services were not available in the suburbs, but there was evidence that these services "could have been arranged," and one housing authority witness was unable to identify "any difference at all" in terms of the authority's non-racial criteria between a suburban and a central city location on opposite sides of the same street. 92 Why should public housing be any exception to the "customs and usages of both the officials and inhabitants" of the suburbs, which the district court found were "to discourage blacks from seeking to purchase or rent homes therein" ? 9 3
In the absence of a credible non-racial explanation, the majority found that the record "clearly shows a 'purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing.' " Its finding was in accord both with other judicial findings on comparable facts 95 But what of the district court's failure specifically to find as a fact that the choice of public housing sites stemmed from a purpose on the part of government officials to discriminate, or to acquiesce in discrimination ?9' One can only speculate as to why the trial judge did not so find. Certainly he did not make a contrary finding, and the thrust of his opinion is consistent with and even implies that he perceived a segregatory purpose in the siting. discriminatory purpose as unnecessary, and accordingly refrained from unnessarily impugning local officials. In any event, the lack of an explicit finding by the district court on this sole issue need not preclude the reviewing court from inferring segregatory purpose on this otherwise adequate and ample record. 99 For a reviewing court either to close its eyes to the apparent, or to remand for yet another round of delay in an already protracted adjudication of civil rights deeply affecting the educational interests of the entire metropolitan Indianapolis population, would on this record be an unjustified adherence to technicality. The case is not as strong for finding a segregatory purpose in the decision to exclude schools from Uni-Gov, but the record supports, indeed recommends, an inference of such a purpose. The effect of excluding schools from Uni-Gov, obvious beforehand to any Indiana legislator or public official, was to perpetuate racial segregation by keeping black students inside Indianapolis and leaving the nearly all-white suburban schools racially undisturbed. 1°D iscriminatory purpose may be inferred from this fact in combination with others, under the "ordinary rule of tort law that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his actions," which is applicable in discerning the intent of public officials in school desegregation cases.) 0 ' Keeping 99. " [F] actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts," and ordinarily a court of appeals should not resolve "in the first instance" a factual dispute not "considered by the District Court." DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, note at 450 (1974) (criminal case). The normal response of an appellate court to a trial court's failure to make findings on a material issue is to vacate the judgment and remand for appropriate findings. See generally 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.06 [2] (1975) at 2718 and cases cited at n.l. However, findings are not a jurisdictional requirement for appeal. Id. at 2721-23 and cases cited 2723 at n.3. In unusual cases appellate courts may themselves determine the merits even though the findings below suffer from "lack of specificity" if a remand would not "add anything essential to the determination of the merits," Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,45 (1975) Here the objective facts concerning housing site decisions have been specifically found; the omitted finding relates only to an inference concerning subjective intent to be drawn from these underlying findings. Because of the urgency suggested in the text, the case should not be remanded for more specific findings if, as here, the inference is clear from findings already of record.
100. "Because, in 1969, 95 percent of the blacks in Marion County lived in the inner city and segregation in its schools was under attack in federal court, it is clear to us that Uni-Gov and its companion 1969 legislation were '[a] substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.' "541 F.2d at 1220, (quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (Stewart, J., concurring)). See also id. at 1214, 1221 (majority), and at 1227-28 (dissent) (majority's " 'racial impact' theory").
101 Indianapolis in a school district separate from the suburbs, like maintaining a neighborhood school policy in racially segregated neighborhoods, could lead to "no other result" but continued school segregation "and this is strong evidence of segregatory intent."
This strong evidence is aggravated by several factors. First was the timing of the decision to exclude schools from Uni-Gov, shortly after the Indianapolis school desegregation suit was filed. Moreover, the opposition to including schools in Uni-Gov consisted mainly of the same suburban governments which the district court found had a custom and usage of discouraging blacks from moving into the suburbs and which participated in the purposefully segregatory public housing site selections. In addition, the exclusion of schools was due not to considerations unique to Uni-Gov's purpose or function, but rather was part of a "failsafe" legislative package designed to ensure that "by one means or another" the Indianapolis school district boundaries would not expand into the suburbs, despite a pre-existing, legislatively declared state policy that the boundaries of the city school district would expand with those of the city itself. 1 03 Looking only to these factors, it is difficult to avoid an inference of segregatory intent.
On the other hand, as Judge Tone observed, there were a number of factors suggesting possible non-racial explanations for the failure to expand the Indianapolis school district's boundaries. 104 Chief among them were fears Neither the per curiam order of remand in the Austin case, nor Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, rejected the "natural and foreseeable consequences" theory adopted by the court of appeals below and also by the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second and Sixth Circuits in the cases cited at 532 F.2d at 389 n. Apart from those factors discussed in the text, Judge Tone suggests five others, some of which overlap. He first refers to "historic" opposition to school consolidation "on non-racial grounds." Id. at 1226. But this refers to a 1959 decision not to expand the Indianapolis school district and subsequent adherence to it. As with the Uni-Gov decision ten years later, however, the tax and citizen participation concerns voiced on behalf of the 1959 decision do not negate an unstated racial basis. Expansion of the Indianapolis school district boundaries then, too, would have exposed suburbs to a potential influx of blacks. Brown I had been decided only five years earlier, and racial segregation in schools had still been official state policy only 10 years earlier. See 541 F.2d at 1212.
Second, Judge Tone cites "the decision to leave other governmental units out of Uni-Gov." Id. at 1226. But see note 64 supra. Third, he points out that "all school boundaries elsewhere in the State were already frozen," id. at 1226, a fact that seems of little relevance except to distinguish Evans. Fourth, he cites the "haphazard" pattern of past municipal annexation, which of higher taxes and loss of citizen interest and participation which could result from an expanded school district. As the majority noted, these two concerns had been "the most substantial reasons advanced" against an earlier attempt to consolidate Marion County school districts. 1 05 While these tax and citizen participation explanations, like a "neighborhood school policy," may be partial explanations, they do not necessarily negate an additional explanation-race.
10 6 There is nothing inconsistent in suburban opposition to school consolidation on all three grounds: tax, citizen participation, and race. But only the first two are likely to be vocalized, especially when a desegregation suit is pending in the local federal courthouse. Where, as here, the objective evidence from which an inference of segregatory intent can be drawn is strong, little can be made of the fact that racial grounds for opposition have not been openly voiced but other grounds have. 1 07 In finding the "natural and foreseeable consequences" rule especial-"depended in large part upon the position taken by the owners of the land affected" and their economic interests. Id. But this of course does not address the special racial threat posed by school district boundaries, nor does it conflict with additional racial explanations. Finally, he relies on the plaintiffs' failure to offer direct evidence of racial motive, to cross-examine defense witnesses claiming other motives, or to claim racial motivation in their briefs. Id. But plaintiffs' abstentions in this regard can be attributed to the inherent difficulty (suggested in the text) of producing direct evidence of bias or eliciting confessions of bias from the witness stand, combined with their legal position that no showing of discriminatory purpose was necessary.
105. 541 F.2d at 1221.
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See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), see note 101 supra; see also Judge Tone's opinion sustaining a finding of discriminatory purpose in the face of an asserted "neighborhood school policy" in Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d at 629 (although there was some testimony in Armstrong suggesting that the policy was at least racially conscious. Id. at 635).
107. Shortly before this article was to go to print, the United States Supreme Court commented on the situation where both racial and non-racial purposes underlie a governmental decision, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977) . In a case involving an allegedly racially discriminatory refusal to rezone a parcel of land, the Court explained that Davis:
does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. Id. at 563. However, the Court later added in a footnote:
[p]roof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required modification of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. Id. at 566 n.2 1. This was dictum since plaintiffs in Arlington Heights had not, in the Court's view, proved that race was even one factor in the refusal to rezone. Id. at 566. In any event, the point is one of equitable remedies, not substantive constitutional law. The footnote concluded not that there would have been no constitutional violation if the Village could show adequate nonracial reasons for its decision, but only that no "judicial interference" would then be called for. Id What Arlington Heights would mean if applied here is that, should racial motivation be inferred from the circumstances of the decision to omit schools from Uni-Gov, the burden shifts ly apt in school desegregation cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that it is difficult-and often futile-to obtain direct evidence of the official's intentions. Rather than announce his intention of violating antidiscrimination laws, it is far more likely that the state official "will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and illusive-for we deal with an area in which 'subtleties of conduct . . . play no small part.' " . . . Hence, courts usually rely on circumstantial evidence to ascertain the decisionmakers' motivations.' 0 8
Here the circumstantial evidence makes out a prima facie case of racial motivation, unrebutted by anything in the record. Although the majority chose not to make an inference of discriminatory intent from the circumstantial evidence concerning Uni-Gov, it regarded this inference as legally unnecessary and made no contrary inference. " But if one assumes arguendo with Judge Tone that Uni-Gov's exclusion of schools required a discriminatory purpose to qualify as an "interdistrict violation," then reviewing courts can and should infer discriminatory purpose from this record.' 1 0 Accordingly, on the facts, the majority's conclusion seems correct even if Judge Tone's view of the law holds the day. Before asking what constitutes an "interdistrict violation," it helps to begin by asking what is a "violation"? In the school desegregation context, there are two distinct lines of cases defining two distinct kinds of "violations." The first line involves an initial violation of the Constitution itself and clearly demands proof of discriminatory purpose as an element of the "violation." Keyes exemplifies: Denver school officials' actions which had to defendants to prove that tax and citizen participation concerns would in any event have excised schools from Uni-Gov's functions. The scant evidence of nonracial purpose in this record, relating mainly to the earlier effort to consolidate rather than to Uni-Gov itself, does not appear to carry defendants' burden. Accordingly, if on remand race is found to be one factor in the Uni-Gov decision, a student transfer remedy within Uni-Gov would not be precluded by the dictum at 97 S. Ct. 566 n.21 in Arlington Heights.
108. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d at 388 (citations and footnote omitted).
109. 541 F.2d at 1221, 1222. 110. The absence of a specific finding of fact on intent by the district court need not preclude the reviewing courts from their own assessments of this question, for the same reasons stated in note 99 and accompanying text supra.
the effect of maintaining racial segregation initially violated the Constitution only if they were purposefully discriminatory."I The second kind of "violation" is not of the Constitution itself but of a remedial obligation, derived from the Constitution and predicated on a prior constitutional violation. This kind of violation need not have a discriminatory purpose, so long as it has the effect of hindering public officials' fulfillment of their affirmative remedial obligation under Green to desegregate a school system once it has been purposefully, unconstitutionally segregated. Thus, in Wright v. Emporia,'12 when a city, assertedly for non-racial purposes, sought to withdraw its schools from a county school system under desegregation orders, the Supreme Court ruled that "[tihe existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."" 3 In so doing it distinguished the two kinds of "violations": initial violation of the Constitution, and subsequent violation of the affirmative obligation to redress the original wrong. "[Tlhe power of the District Court to enjoin Emporia's withdrawal from that system need not rest upon an independent constitutional violation. The Court's remedial power was invoked on the basis of a [prior] finding that the dual school system violated the Constitution, .... "114 This suggests a misplaced emphasis in Judge Tone's reasoning in Board of School Commissioners. In demanding that any nominee for "interdistrict violation" under Milliken first present credentials of discriminatory purpose, Judge Tone focuses on the first kind of violation, largely ignoring the second. Thus he phrases the question as what "constitutional rights" did Uni-Gov or the siting of public housing violate?'
1 5 Yet even Davis, the case upon which his dissent heavily relies, "1 6 recognizes the second kind of violation, in which "the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor." 117 115. 541 F.2d at 1225. Seealso note 85 and accompanying text supra. Only in a brief passage, criticizing the majority's "attempts to avoid the necessity of finding discriminatory purpose by postulating an affirmative duty under Green .... ," does Judge Tone come close to recognizing the second kind of violation. Even then, he uses the term "violation" only in reference to the underlying constitutional violation and, once, in reference to an "affirmative duty to use interdistrict means to remedy intradistrict violations," which he says does not exist. 542 F.2d at 1227. 117. 426 U.S. at 243. Citing Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), for that proposition, Davis explains that because racial segregation until 1969 supplied the "constitutional predicate" in Wright, there was no need to find an "independent constitutional violation" to set aside the division of the district because it "had the effect of interfering with the federal decree." The reasoning of Wright did not turn on the existence of a federal decree, although it was an aggravating factor, and Davis, by referring to the segregation itself as the "constitutional predicate," does not purport to so limit Wright.
But when Milliken uses the phrase "interdistrict violation," does it contemplate both kinds of violations or only the first, as Judge Tone seems to believe? There certainly is language in the holding from which one might infer that only the first kind, violations of the Constitution itself, can justify interdistrict relief. For example, the holding speaks of a "constitutional violation" and a "constitutional wrong."
118 However, these terms are ambiguous and if used in the broad sense could also encompass violations of the remedial obligation under Green, which is derived from the Constitution and predicated upon a constitutional violation.
Indeed, this broad sense seems to be the one intended in Milliken. Just before its holding, the plurality opinion cites Wright for the proposition that " What this means for the Indianapolis case is that the exclusion of schools from Uni-Gov need not have been purposefully discriminatory to amount to an "interdistrict violation with interdistrict effects" under Milliken. If it violated the State of Indiana's affirmative obligation under Green to desegregate Indianapolis schools, an obligation no one denies, it qualifies as a "violation." The only remaining question 121 then would be whether this violation had "interdistrict effects," which is also denied by no one.
The decisive question then is, did Uni-Gov without schools violate the state's affirmative obligations? Clearly under Milliken, as Judge Tone argues, the state had no affirmative duty to expand the city school district boundaries in order to remedy inner city segregation. 122 But Michigan had not also expanded the City of Detroit's boundaries to embrace the suburbs into which students might be transferred. Nor, in the process of doing so, had Michigan excluded schools from the expansion, while abandoning a prior state statutory policy that the school district expand coterminously with the city. Indiana, on the other hand, did all these things with respect to Indianapolis. Although under no obligation to initiate the process, once the state voluntarily undertook a comprehensive boundary realignment potentially affecting all major government services including schools, it could not fulfill its Green obligations without at least considering the effect of various boundary locations on desegregation of Indianapolis schools.
12 4 Apparently it did not do or purport to do even this.
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Moreover, it is arguable that Indiana's obligation to use the most effective means to desegregate central city schools meant that it could not exclude them from a general expansion of city boundaries without some greater justification than a mere rational, permissible state purpose. Even if no showing was needed of the "compelling state interest" required to justify deliberate racial discrimination, 126 still some significant, demonstrably threatened state interest should have been shown to justify rejection of so obviously effective a means to fulfill the state's remedial obligations under Green. The vague suggestions here of some tenuous threat to citizen participation and to fair allocation of tax burdens were not enough.
The enactment of Uni-Gov, without consideration of its effect on racial segregation, and without demonstrably adequate justification for its enactment despite those effects, violated Indiana's affirmative, constitutionally grounded obligation under Green to use the most effective means available to desegregate Indianapolis schools. This "violation" had interdistrict effects, since it tended to perpetuate racial segregation in both the central city and A similar argument can be made concerning the siting of public housing. As the Board of School Commissioners majority noted, "It is obvious that there is a close relationship between the racial balance in housing and the racial balance in schools.''127 Because of that close relationship, Indiana's obligations under Green arguably included the obligation to utilize state housing programs to maximize school desegregation in Indianapolis. 28 The failure to do so, without even consideration of the effects of housing sites on school desegregation, and without demonstrably adequate justification for confining the public housing to the central city despite those effects, violated the state's remedial obligations under Green. The siting decisions amounted to an interdistrict violation with interdistrict effects and justified interdistrict pupil transfers.
The housing injunction in Board of School Commissioners was not only appropriate but could have gone even further. 129 The housing authority, an agency of the State of Indiana, was at all relevant times empowered to operate in an area transcending the central city boundaries. 3 0 Relief related to future housing sites anywhere within Uni-Gov's boundaries (where the housing authority can now operate) is therefore not really "interdistrict" in the Milliken sense. Just as in Hills v. Gautreaux' 3 1 the "relevant geographic area" for the Chicago and federal housing agencies was the Chicago "housing market area," 132 so the relevant geographic area for the authority's administration of housing programs in this case is Uni-Gov. And as in Hills, a decree directing the Indianapolis housing authority to take affirmative steps to site new public housing in suburbs within Uni-Gov need not "impermissibly interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities.' ' 133 127. 541 F.2d at 1222. 128. Green speaks of an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system..." 391 U.S. at 437-38. Green embodies an "implicit command ...
. that all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy." North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) .
129. This bold statement must be subjected to at least one caveat. The district court enjoined further public housing not only in black areas of the central city, as did the court in the Chicago case, but in the entire central city, including its white areas. 135 The most important thing to be said of this remand is that it by no means requires reversal. 1 36 It does demand a re-examination of the court of appeals' reasoning and, in particular, its initial treatment of Davis.
In light of Davis and Arlington Heights, two essential questions appear to face the court of appeals on remand. First, was there an interdistrict violation within Uni-Gov and, second, if there was, does it support a remedial decree transferring students across the inner city school district line to the extent this one does?
As to the first question, the court of appeals has at least four basic options:
(1) The court could find no purposeful interdistrict constitutional violation and no violation outside the central city of the state's remedial obligations and accordingly reverse the "interdistrict" portion of the decree below.
With respect to the housing violations, this option seems to have been ruled out by the court's earlier finding of purposeful discrimination. 13 7 With respect to the decision to enact Uni-Gov without schools among its functions, this option would be inconsistent with the evidence of purposeful discriminabe predicated upon housing violations here. Such relief would clearly interfere with the operation of local suburban school districts. It must therefore find justification not in a Hills theory, but only in Milliken's authorization of interdistrict relief when there exists an interdistrict violation with interdistrict effects. See id. at 296-97, 300-06.
134 The Court gives no reason for its failure to follow our usual practice in this situation of vacating the judgment below and remanding in order to permit the lower court to reconsider its ruling in light of our intervening decision. The Court's articulation of a legal standard nowhere mentioned in Davis indicates that it feels that the application of Davis to these facts calls for substantial analysis. If this is true, we would do better to allow the Court of Appeals to attempt that analysis in the first instance. Given that the Court deems it necessary to re-examine the evidence in the case in light of the legal standard it adopts, a remand is especially appropriate. Id. at 567. 137. That finding should not be disturbed because of the Supreme Court's explication in Arlington Heights of Davis and the factors to be considered in discerning purpose. The Supreme Court listed, "without purporting to be exhaustive," the following categories of "circumstantial and direct evidence": (1) the "impact," (2) the "historical background," (3) the "specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," (4) " [d] epartures from the normal procedural sequence," and (5) substantive departures, "particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached." 97 S. Ct. at 564.
There are no surprises in this list; indeed it reflects the kinds of factors discussed in the court of appeals' opinion in the Indianapolis case, and which apparently underlay its finding of purposeful discrimination in the siting of public housing. tion previously discussed, 38 and with the violation of the state's remedial obligation articulated earlier.
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(2) The court could reiterate its prior finding of racially discriminatory purpose in the housing decisions, and make such a finding with respect to the Uni-Gov decision for the reasons previously stated' 4° and proceed to consider the extent of the remedy.
(3) Instead of, or in addition to, finding racial purpose, the court could conclude that the Uni-Gov decision violated the state's remedial obligations for the reasons already stated 14 1 and proceed to consider the extent of the remedy. The Wright theory outlined above 142 was not urged upon the Supreme Court by any of the parties and is not inconsistent with the remand for further consideration in light of Davis and Arlington Heights. However, the novelty of this theory in a Milliken context, coupled with its departure from the results if not the reasoning of the Supreme Court's recent school decisions, 143 might earn it a less hospitable reception by the Justices than simply finding that race was a factor in the Uni-Gov decision.
(4) The court of appeals could remand to the district court for further findings, and possibly evidentiary hearings, on the issue of whether race was a factor in the Uni-Gov decision.
In the interest of expedition and for reasons stated earlier 144 no remand for findings concerning racial purpose should be necessary if the court, on this record, discerns that race was a factor.
On the other hand, if the court interprets the order of remand to condition an interdistrict remedy on a finding of racially discriminatory purpose and is unable to so find on this record, it would be appropriate to remand for further findings and possibly evidentiary hearings. Neither the district court nor the parties had the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Davis and Arlington Heights, and they ought not to be foreclosed from any opportunity to respond to the constitutional test as newly clarified. Constitutional rights are too important to be waived by lack of foresight, at least where many courts of appeals, including this one, were also unable to predict the Supreme Court's recent insistence upon proof and findings of racial purpose. 1 45 If the court of appeals finds an interdistrict violation, it then faces the second question, the extent of the remedy. Are interdistrict transfers which 138 aim for fifteen percent minority enrollment in most schools within Uni-Gov appropriate? 146 Until recently, this would not have been a serious question. Once a constitutional violation was found, lower courts had a relatively free hand to use it as the basis for a wide-ranging remedial decree within a single district. 4 7 Presumably under Milliken, once an interdistrict violation were found, the trial court could reach anywhere within the affected districts. 148 However, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that even where interdistrict violations are shown, no interdistrict student transfers can be ordered if defendants can show that suburban schools would have been racially segregated even absent the violations. 1 49 Since it is unlikely that the parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases on this newly defined issue, a remand for pertinent evidentiary presentations by both sides would seem warranted if this remedial approach is adopted.
Especially here, where the district court has relied upon a history and pattern of various kinds of racial segregation in Indiana,15 0 unraveling strands of causation would be enormously difficult. Whether the student transfer remedy would ultimately be sustained might depend upon how heavy a burden of proof were in practice demanded of defendants.
Looking Forward
As the Indianapolis case already illustrates, the aftermath of Milliken has been confusion. Under the approach there adopted and still being elaborated by the Supreme Court, the propriety of metropolitan-wide relief seems to turn largely on the factual idiosyncracies of each city. The results in Detroit, Indianapolis, and Wilmington may all differ. Yet the underlying national pattern of wrong seems too basic and too common to justify such drastic variations in the permissible geographical scope of the remedy. Perhaps, as Mr. Justice Powell urged in Keyes, the Supreme Court's approach should make results depend more on common reality and less on elaborate conceptual refinements. In the metropolitan setting, that reality is one in which state and local government officials are neither fully responsible for, nor wholly innocent in, the racial gap between increasingly white 146 5 ' uniformity of result among cities will indeed be achieved. Milliken's meaning will then be clear: subject to rare, hypothetical exceptions, the present Court will not require the relatively affluent, white suburbs to participate in ameliorating the educational residue of historic discrimination in the relatively poor, black central cities. If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court ultimately affirms interdistrict decrees in the pending cases, the door could be open for a gradual evolution toward a remedial presumption like the one already used for awarding attorneys fees in civil rights cases generally, 152 or the one used for awarding back pay' 5 3 and retroactive seniority 1 54 in employment discrimination cases. Metropolitanwide relief would "ordinarily" be appropriate, "unless special circumstances would render [the remedy] unjust." 155
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE, SEX OR AGE
The court of appeals this term promoted effective judicial redress of employment discrimination against blacks and women by a consistently liberal interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156 Two non-Title VII cases, however, deserve initial comment because of their potentially broad implications for equal protection cases generally and sex discrimination cases in particular.
In White v. Fleming, 57 the court meticulously reviewed the recent controversy over the proper standard of review in equal protection cases, but at least for the moment declined to pass judgment on it. White involved a prosecution under a Milwaukee ordinance prohibiting female employees of taverns from sitting with male patrons. 15 8 In holding that the sex discrimination in the ordinance violated the equal protection clause, the court identified three general standards of review, but did not clearly indicate which standard it was applying in the case at bar.
The first standard was the "rational basis" test, which demands that a legislative classification bear a rational relationship to the objective of the law in which it appears. The second was the "strict scrutiny" test, under which discrimination can be justified only if essential to promote a "compelling state interest," and which has been used in cases involving "fundamental interests" or "suspect classifications." Four Justices of the United States Supreme Court-but only four-have opined that sex is such a suspect classification. 159 The third, "intermediary" standard has been invoked by some courts dissatisfied with the unhappily rigid choice between the first test, which almost any discriminatory law can meet, and the second test, which almost none can meet. For lack of a better shorthand, this intermediary test might be described as the "fair and substantial" relation test; it requires the discrimination to bear a fair and substantial relation to the statutory objective. 160 After carefully reviewing cases applying the three tests, the court in White summarized ambiguously: "[Wihatever formulation the [Supreme] Court may ultimately adopt, it can at least be divined. . . that we may not accept a classification based solely on sex without further inquiry as to whether the differences between men and women rationally justify the classification." 161 If this language seemed to suggest adherence to the traditional rational basis test, the court's subsequent analysis suggested some sort of intermediary test. Under the rational basis test, "a classification must be sustained 'if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' "162 However, in evaluating the Milwaukee bar ordinance, the court refrained from the kind of imaginative speculation too often stimulated by this doctrine. Assumptions that prostitutes tend to be women and to frequent bars, asserted the court, "do not in logic or experience support broader assumptions about all or most women who work in bars or the relative proclivities of men and women, ... . " 16 3 The equal protection clause does not tolerate "stereotyped assumptions concerning propensities thought to exist in some members of a given sex." 164 The court concluded, "This is not necessarily to say that sex is 161. 522 F.2d at 736. 162. Id. at 734. While acknowledging some cases in which the United States Supreme Court was less willing than it formerly had been to ascribe legitimate purposes to the legislative body, the court viewed the "reasonably conceivable" language as "reaffirmed" by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975 an inherently suspect classification, a point which the Supreme Court has yet to decide." 1
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Only two months later, however, in another opinion written by Judge Tone, the court seemed to be taken in by the very kind of "stereotyped assumptions" it rejected in White. In Mims v. Board of Education,166 five female and six male employees in the job category "Film Serviceman I" were laid off. The six men, but not the women, were kept on temporarily for doing "heavy work of moving equipment. ",167 The women filed suit charging sex discrimination. The district court found that these facts did not demonstrate sex discrimination and the court of appeals upheld the finding as not clearly erroneous. The defendant, explained the court, "determined to retain the six males because he considered the temporary males able to do the heavy lifting and moving that the female civil servants would be unable to do. It is reasonable to take into account the individual's physical capabilities in determining who can perform a certain kind of work."1
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Yet that is precisely the point. The women were entitled to be judged on their individual physical capabilities relative to those of the men and not to be excluded on the basis of a stereotyped assumption about the frailty of their sex. Indeed, in also holding that the women had been denied due process for lack of a hearing before their layoffs, the court tacitly admitted that the frailty might lie in the stereotype, not in the women. "Plaintiffs at least were entitled to an opportunity to attempt to demonstrate that they were capable of performing the work assigned to the six temporary employees." 169 If the ruling on the merits in Mims is less enlightened than in White, the ruling on the remedy in Mims is even more difficult to understand. Having determined that plaintiffs were denied due process, the court held defendants immune from damages on the ground that they had acted in good faith and not unreasonably. 1 70 But it then proceeded to deny plaintiffs any remedy whatsoever. It explained only that "[f]ive years after the action complained of is too late to order injunctive relief," to reinstate plaintiffs or to offer them another position. 17 1 Yet the five years had passed almost entirely because the district court had twice ruled incorrectly on the merits, and had twice been overruled by the court of appeals. On this second appeal, however, the district court's erroneous ruling was technically affirmed, "[s]ince plaintiffs are not entitled to relief." 7 2 Plaintiffs, after five years of apparently diligent prosecution of their lawsuit, had a right without a remedy. The apparent injustice in Mims contrasts with a more favorable result obtained to date by plaintiff in Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.,173 one of the more important Title VII cases decided this term and presently pending before the United State Supreme Court. Two issues were presented in Evans, albeit obscurely. One was substantive, having to do with whether a seniority system which perpetuates the effects of past discrimination is itself an independent violation of Title VII. The other was jurisdictional, having to do with when the statutory 180-day limitations period under Title VII begins to run in a case challenging such a seniority system. 174 Plaintiff Evans had "involuntarily resigned" as a United stewardess in February 1968, because of a company policy which disqualified women who married from continuing as stewardesses. 175 In November 1968, United discontinued this policy, which was ruled unlawfully discriminatory in 1971 .176 In February of 1972 Evans was rehired without the seniority she had accrued through 1968. A year later she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 177 charging that this denial of seniority constituted sex discrimination.
The district court rejected plaintiff Evans' argument that the 1972 denial of seniority, by perpetuating the effects of past discrimination, was a "current and continuing" violation of Title VII. 178 The court of appeals initially agreed, but on rehearing reversed and remanded. 1 79 The substantive issue was prima facie simple. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that under Title VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 18 0 United's policy of denying accrued seniority to persons rehired after a prior termination, when applied to persons like Evans whose termination had been caused by a discriminatory employment practice, unlawfully operated to "freeze in" the effects of the prior discrimination. 18 1 Consequently the 180-day limitations period was no bar to suit, because plaintiff Evans clearly filed her EEOC charge within 180 days of the "current and continuing" discriminatory denial of her accrued seniority. 182 United's defense on the merits lay in an exception to Title VII which allows an employer to treat employees differently "pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system." 183 However, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. ,184 decided by the United States Supreme Court while the petition for rehearing in Evans was pending, seems to answer this defense. The Supreme Court held that this exception to Title VII protects the operation of a seniority system only when challenged as perpetuating effects of discrimination occurring "prior to the effective date of the Act." ' 185 Since Title VII was effective in 1965 and the original discrimination against plaintiff Evans did not occur until 1968, Franks clearly indicates that the "bona fide seniority system" exception could not be invoked against Evans. The court of appeals properly so held, after rehearing the case in light of Franks.
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Apart from the bona fide seniority system defense, defendant United argued with superficial plausibility that "if a discriminatory act is considered to continue for so long as there is some lingering effect, every alleged discriminatory act could be litigated at any time. A discrimination, ... would never be final, despite the limitation period . . , since there might always be some lingering effects-monetary or otherwise." 8 7 The court's opinion does not make clear whether United urged this as a defense on the merits against an expansive interpretation of "unlawful employment practices" under Title VII, or as an argument on the proper interpretation of the statutory limitations period, or in some other way. Certainly the argument cannot prevail as a defense on the merits. Cases striking down practices which "freeze in" effects of past discrimination have long since passed it by. 187. These are the words of the court, not of United. 534 F.2d at 1249. 188. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and cases cited in Evans, 534 F.2d at 1250 n. 15. These cases demonstrate that International Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960), is not dispositive of Evans. In Machinists, the Court rejected under the National Labor Relations Act a limitations argument parallel to that made under Title VII by plaintiff Evans. However, the limitations provision there was construed strictly because of the purposes of the statute in which it appeared, which were "overall" to promote industrial peace, including "stability of bargaining relationships." Id. at 428, 425. The complainant's interest, "employee freedom of choice," was important but secondary, see id. at 428, and Congress manifested a specific intention not to disturb collective bargaining agreements more than six months after their inception, however unlawful. Id. at 426-27. The dual purposes of Title VII , in contrast, are to eradicate discrimination and to make victims whole so far as possible. Franks v. Bowman can it prevail in interpreting the statutory limitations period. If the offense is indeed current and continuing, United's argument would have the limitations period end before the offense is committed.
The argument deserves a hearing, if at all, on the remedy. 8 9 If a Title VII plaintiff inexcusably waits too long, either she should be denied relief altogether or her relief should be curtailed, such as by denying all credit for accrued seniority.
But plaintiff Evans did not wait too long. The offense here-refusal to grant her accrued seniority--did not and could not commence until she was rehired in February of 1972. She is not seeking damages for her involuntary termination in 1968. True, after being rehired she waited a year before filing charges with the EEOC. But given the novelty of her claim and the fact that she, like most Title VII claimants, is not a lawyer, one year is hardly an unconscionable period, particularly on a claim of continuing wrong. 190 Just as Title VII plaintiffs are not held to professional pleading standards, 19 1 so they ought not be held to the standards of expedition demanded of corporate employers advised by specialized counsel on permanent retainers.
United thus presented a good argument in theory but not on these facts. The result reached by the court of appeals deserves to be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The non-technical reception which Title VII plaintiffs deserve was underscored by the court of appeals sitting en banc in Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance. 192 On her EEOC complaint form, plaintiff had indicated the nature of her claim by checking the box for race discrimination, Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976) ..These purposes counsel a more flexible reading of the limitations period under Title VII. Moreover, the "freeze-in" cases have regularly brought seniority relations originating more than six months prior to the filing of a discrimination charge within reach of judicial redress under Title VII.
189. Both retroactive seniority and backpay can be denied, and presumably limited, in particular cases "for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. but not the box for sex discrimination. Her narrative complaint explained that she had experienced no problem until she began wearing an Afro hair style. She was then accused of being "the leader of the girls." The complaint asserted that she was forced either to transfer to another job or to terminate her employment, and that a white friend "might have been denied her promotion because of her association with me.
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The court held these claims before the EEOC sufficient to qualify plaintiff to file a subsequent class action on behalf of "all black and female persons who are employed, or might be employed, by Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc.," 194 and, the court implied, to " 'launch a full scale inquiry' " into employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex at Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 195 The controlling standard, all members of the court agreed, was that a Title VII suit could " 'properly encompass any . . . discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge [before the EEOC] and growing out of such allegations.' "'19 Three judges, however, including the two who had formed the majority on the earlier, contrary panel decision, dissented on the application of the standard to the facts.
In the course of its opinion the court reaffirmed that "Title VII is to 'be construed and applied broadly,' "197 and expressly adopted a policy already recognized elsewhere "of being 'solicitous of the Title VII plaintiff.' "198 In any event, the full court agreed that wholly apart from Title VII, plaintiff's EEOC complaint could not limit her eligibility to represent a class on her race discrimination complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.199
In addition to Evans and Jenkins, the court ruled for plaintiffs in a number of other cases raising procedural issues under Title VII. In Adams v. Brinegar, 2 00 the court ruled that the 1972 amendment subjecting federal government employers to Title VII applied retroactively to cases pending administratively on its effective date. 20 1 In McGuire v. ALCOA ,202 the court held that the ninety-day period for filing suit under Title VII begins to run on the date the plaintiff receives a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, not on the earlier date when notice is received from the EEOC that the letter may be requested. 203 In Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2 04 the court permitted a member of a class which the district court had declined to certify to intervene in the named plaintiffs' Title VII action, four years after it was filed but only three weeks after the final order and four days after the would-be class member learned for certain that the denial of class certification was not being appealed. In Caro v. Schultz,205 the court correctly anticipated the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Chandler v. Roudebush 2°6 that federal employees are entitled to a trial de novo in Title VII suits, even if the record of the administrative hearing clearly fails to establish a finding of discrimination. Finally, in Denofre v. Transportation Insurance Rating Bureau ,207 after a district court ruled against a Title VII plaintiff without making all the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law required by rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court of appeals remanded for the necessary findings and conclusions to be made. 20 8 Judge Swygert, however, dissented on the ground that nothing less than a new trial would do. 2°9 The portion of the record below quoted in his dissent reveals that the court of appeals' liberal attitude toward Title VII actions is not necessarily reflected in the trial courts. The trial judge had voiced the following opinion just before granting defendant's motion to dismiss without argument.
These days, everytime a woman or a black or a Latino or an elderly person or a young person loses his job, it is a violation these days that their civil rights have been violated, and they flood the federal court not only here but throughout the country and this is a new way of trying to retain your job, regardless of why they are released.21' Transient frustration, perhaps, produced these remarks. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand why any plaintiff should be remanded to a trial judge who has expressed such blatant bias.
Two contrasting decisions, one granting and one denying a preliminary injunction, offer useful lessons for Title VII practitioners in challenges to system-wide employment discrimination in government agencies. 211 In Crockett v. Green,2 1 2 the district court granted a preliminary injunction against racial discrimination in employment of skilled craft workers by members of the Milwaukee Board of City Service Commissioners. The order enjoined defendants from demanding apprenticeship and experience as prerequisites for some positions. Defendants were ordered to hire one black person for every two openings in each skilled craft job classification until the percentage of blacks in that classification equalled the percentage of blacks in Milwaukee.
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The court of appeals held that the ratio hiring, "for a limited period as part of a broad equitable remedy," was within the district court's discretion. 214 Without explanation, the court also held that the district court's choice of the percentage of blacks in Milwaukee (seventeen percent) as a target ratio, rather than the "considerably lower" percentage of blacks in the metropolitan area, was within its discretion. 215 Finally, the court rejected defendants' contention that the ratios should not immediately apply to upper-level positions which required extensive training and to which whites already in entry-level jobs legitimately expected to be promoted. The court noted that the order did not require employment of "nonqualified employees". 216 Finally, the court cautioned that it was not reviewing a permanent injunction. One could not confidently predict how the ratio hiring system would work, and the district court might in the future modify its order as needed. 2 17 Instead of seeking affirmative relief specifying the racial composition of new recruits, as in Crockett, plaintiffs in Washington v. Walker 218 sought temporarily to bar the Illinois State Police from hiring any new troopers. 219 The district court refused to grant such a preliminary injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed, mainly because "the harm to the public from unfilled state police positions out-weighed the injury to the plaintiffs.' 220 In addition, 212. 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976). In addition to the rulings discussed in the text, the court upheld the certification of a class of all blacks capable of working in or being trained for skilled craft jobs and who have been or will be denied such jobs because of their race, and the designation of the sole named plaintiff, a trained bricklayer, to represent it. The court declared, "Class action status is particularly appropriate in a case involving class discrimination. 225 She was therefore forced to rely on the alternative theories that the officials of the private university had acted under color of state law so as to bring the discrimination within 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that they had conspired to deprive her of federally protected rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).226
Neither theory succeeded. Although Illinois Institute of Technology received some financial support from the state, the court of appeals held that it was "not so heavily dependent on the State as to be considered the equivalent of a public university for all purposes and in all its activities." 227 Elsewhere, action by private universities receiving "substantial financial support" has been regarded as tantamount to state action, but I.I.T. received "only a small fraction" of its revenue from the state. Even so, that would have been enough "to require a finding of state action if that support ha[d] furthered the specific policies or conduct under attack." 228 But here it had not.
For the same reason, plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim failed. Unlike victims of racial discrimination, she had no federally protected rights to equal treatment in the purely private sector under the thirteenth amendment, and the fourteenth amendment forbids arbitrary sex discrimination only by states. 229 Thus, even assuming that defendants conspired to discriminate against her, they did not conspire to deprive her of any federal rights under either Cohen must be read with care. It does not mean that discrimination by a private university is not state action. Nor does it hold that section 1985(3) does not cover a private conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of sex. Resolution of both issues in Cohen depended on examination of the facts; in another case the result may differ.
Another victim of both alleged employment discrimination and the absence of an applicable remedial statute was the plaintiff in Gault v. Garrison. 231 Forced to retire as a public school teacher at the age of sixty-five, she claimed that the admitted age discrimination denied her due process and equal protection of the laws. 232 In the face of two summary affirmances by the Supreme Court of decisions rejecting similar claims, 233 236. In Murgia, the Court concluded: "We decide only that the system enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection of the law." 96 S. Ct. at 2568. In context, the Court meant by this merely to disclaim passing on the wisdom of the statute, not to signal clearly that it might invalidate different mandatory retirement statutes. Nonetheless, the discrimination in Murgia may be distinguishable from other, less defensible age discrimination. The decision stressed the " 'general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond to the demands of the [state police officer's] job.' " Id. at 2565 (citation omitted). Other jobs, such as judicial positions, might not show such rational correlation between age and qualification. See id. at 2573 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In addition, the due process question of an irrebuttable presumption raised in Gault was not explicitly decided in Murgia. See id. at 2564, 2565. However, it was raised in the briefs. The Court apparently chose simply to ignore the issue. The result in Murgia, therefore, necessarily rejects the irrebuttable presumption argument, which was already floundering in the wake of Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) . See also the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 621-634 (1976), which protects employees who are at least forty but less than sixty-five from discharge on grounds of age, except "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C.
§ § 623(f)(1), 631 (1976).
FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
In three cases this term, the court of appeals seemed keenly appreciative of the nature and importance of first amendment freedoms. However, it resolved free speech issues only after careful consideration of facts relevant to what it regarded as countervailing interests, of the means used to promote those interests, and of their impact on first amendment interests.
The court's decision in Hanneman v. Breier 237 may foreshadow its eventual response to post-Watergate government security litigation now wending through trial courts. 237 . 1 In Hanneman, the court held that an administrative rule making all "official business" of the Milwaukee police department "confidential" was unconstitutional as applied. 2 38 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Education 239 and on one of its own prior decisions, 240 the court of appeals emphatically adopted a case-by-case, interest-balancing approach, at least in cases involving first amendment rights of public employees.
Several police union members had written relevant city and state officials confirming the existence of an internal departmental investigation. While invalidating administrative sanctions imposed on these officers for breach of the confidentiality rule, the court provisionally declined to enjoin further application of the rule. In dicta, it characterized the confidentiality rule as "clearly valid on its face.' ,241 "To justify application of the confidentiality rule in this case," the court held that the defendant police chief "must show a state interest in confidentiality applicable on these facts which outweighs the public and individual interests in the particular statements made. "
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Analyzing the state's interest, the court conceded that a public employer, in a general sense, "has a legitimate interest in preserving confidentiality in the conduct of its internal affairs," particularly "in the sensitive area of law enforcement. "243 In this case, however, before the officers wrote their letters, the privacy of the investigation had been "destroyed" in a front-page newspaper article quoting an acknowledgment of the investigation by the police chief himself. Moreover, noted the court, the officers involved were not "in such a close personal relationship" with the police chief "that sharp public criticism could not be tolerated.' ,244 In addition, the chief was free in this instance to defend himself publicly.
The court then considered the officers' first amendment interests. Police officers, unlike members of the military services, " 'are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.' "245 Although their freedom to speak concerning their employment "may be more or less limited,' 246 the officers' letter here was worthy of protection. It accused the department's highest official, the police chief, of "improper," anti-union motives in ordering an investigation of union-related political activities by the officers. 247 The officers had no practical alternative but to go outside the department with an appeal to responsible officials for protection. Even though the district court found that the investigation was not improperly motivated, the officers' letter still merited protection because it was written in good faith. The state's interest in preventing publication of false criticism, ruled the court of appeals, could override its employees' interests in free speech only if their statements were knowingly or recklessly false. 24 8 Without indicating whether the officers' interests in free speech alone would also outweigh the state's separate and additional interest in confidentiality, the court went on to consider the "public's interest in being informed." 249 At the core of the first amendment, it said, "is a preference for debate rather than suppression." 250 The officers' letter "touched on matters of public concern' '-public employment and collective bargaining by public employees-for which its recipients were officially responsible. 251 In sum, considering "all the factors," the court concluded that the "need to enforce the confidentiality rule against the statements here in issue" was outweighed by "the individual and public interests in their expression.' '252 It then remanded for consideration of the appropriate remedy.
In three other first amendment cases this term, the court's decisions were more circumscribed by precedent. Procunier held that prisoners' first amendment rights "must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment.' "255 Prison censorship regulations can be justified only if they further "one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation," if their restrictive impact on first amendment freedoms is "no greater than is necessary or essential" to protect those interests, and if prison officials carry their burden of proving both of these conditions.
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In addition to Procunier, the court of appeals premised its analysis on Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,257 in which the Supreme Court had held that a statute "should not be deemed facially invalid unless [1] it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts . . and [2] its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial. '258 In theory, said Judge Tone for the court, the same test would "normally" apply to administrative regulations, but here the court could not ignore that local prison officials had banned "inter alia, Dostoevski's The Gambler, Gibran's The Prophet, and all publications of Bantam Books." 259 Following Procunier and Erznoznik, the court invalidated three regulations. One appeared to prohibit photos or paintings of nudes unless "supportive or incidental to a theme not designed primarily to arouse sexual desires.'" 26 This, reasoned the court, might exclude "a collection of works of art" conveying no theme, innocent or otherwise. 26 1 Another regulation prohibited literature that encouraged "aggressive hostility toward prison authorities" or toward minority groups, "or having a substantially inflammatory effect on inmates," including material "in any way subversive of institutional discipline." , 262 This one bore more than a passing resemblance to a regulation invalidated in Procunier and, as in that case, invited prison officials " 'to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards.' "263 The last regulation prohibited literature "glorifying criminals, discussing the modus operandi of a felon, or treating in a bizarre fashion the details or circumstances of a crime." 264 267 the court predictably found Mr. Carson to be "an all-purpose public figure." ' 268 Unfortunately, in also characterizing Ms. Holland as a public figure, the court ventured that "one can assume that the wife of a public figure such as Carson more or less automatically becomes at least a part-time public figure herself.' ,269
The court then examined whether the facts could support the finding of "actual malice" required to sustain libel actions brought by public figures.
Relying on two factors-" completely fabricated" accusations, and "wholly imagined but supposedly precisely quoted conversations' '-the court found enough to entitle the plaintiff couple to a jury trial. 270 Defendants' professed absence of malice toward plaintiffs was immaterial, since what counted was their "attitude toward the truth or falsity" of their statements, and defendants had "a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity." 271 In the third case, Grandco Corp. v. Rochford,272 the court had no trouble invalidating a Chicago ordinance requiring an operating license for a public place of amusement, as it applied to movie theaters. 273 The ordinance provided that the mayor "may" issue a license upon a "satisfactory" showing that the applicant is a "fit and proper" person. Such terms patently failed to provide the "narrow, objective and definite standards" required to license exercise of first amendment freedoms by such Supreme Court decisions as Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham. 274 The difficulty was in reaching the merits. Two of three plaintiffs did not. They had no licenses and were apparently being repeatedly prosecuted for 265 The one plaintiff who survived Younger faced no pending criminal prosecution. That plaintiff did face pending city administrative proceedings to revoke theater operating licenses. However, said the court, comity under Younger mandated federal restraint "only upon an express finding that the state's interest in its own [administrative] proceedings is substantial and that those proceedings provide a proper forum for vindication of the federal plaintiffs' constitutional claim.''278 Chicago's administrative proceedings were not such a forum for this plaintiff.
Declaratory relief "at a minimum" was therefore permissible and the court affirmed the declaratory judgment entered below on behalf of this plaintiff. However, since such relief was "sufficient in itself" in this case, and a permanent injunction might involve additional "considerations of comity and federalism" upon which the Supreme Court had yet to pass, the court of appeals remanded with directions to vacate the permanent injunction which had been awarded. 279 The practical effect of Younger and its aftermath, as cautiously construed in Grandco, is to tone down the free speech guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to no more than an uncertain echo of the first amendment. In federal court, the fourteenth, while retaining the full substantive content of the first amendment, lacks its remedial force. State or local restriction of free speech by criminal laws is all too often shielded by comity from federal suit. Restriction by administrative regulation is sometimes equally beyond federal redress, 280 and in other situations subject only to minimal redress.
The court in Grandco might at least have affirmed the permanent injunction against future enforcement of the ordinance with respect to enforcement against movie theaters.
28 1 Perhaps the court presumed that the 275. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 276. 536 F.2d 201-07. It was not clear whether there were in fact prosecutions pending against one of these two plaintiffs when the federal suit was filed, but the court concluded that the pendency of such proceedings could "fairly be inferred" from the complaint. 280. This is in the situation where the regulations afford a "proper forum" for presentation of federal constitutional claims and the state has a "substantial" interest in the administrative procedures thus established. Id. at 206, 208. 281. The district court had enjoined "all further and future enforcement" of the ordinance; the court of appeals enjoined none. Id. at 208. declaratory judgment would automatically stimulate a proper revision of the ordinance and, if not, that the next applicant improperly denied a permit could readily obtain an injunction, since the city's failure to heed the declaratory judgment would then sufficiently demonstrate bad faith. But what of permit applicants unaware of the court's ruling or not advised by counsel? Until an injunction finally issues, a mere declaratory judgment gives no assurance that their constitutional rights will not be violated by an ordinance already ruled facially unconstitutional. A declaratory judgment may protect the next litigant, but it does not necessarily protect the next persons to bear the brunt of the unconstitutional ordinance, unless they also have the awareness, determination, and financial wherewithal to take their grievances to court. First amendment freedoms, as embodied in the-fourteenth amendment, deserve more protection than this.
282
In state courts, the fourteenth amendment is theoretically preserved intact, both substantively and remedially. But as demonstrated by the history of federal court redemption of free speech from abridgements tolerated by state courts, 283 these tribunals are often inadequate guardians of federal rights. In some times and places, their inadequacy is notorious. The 1871 Civil Rights Act (under which plaintiffs in Grandco sued) was enacted largely because Congress recognized as much. 2 4 Federal courts ought not, as Grandco does, shortchange the first amendment in the name of respect for federalism and states' rights. Rights of citizens are usually more easily infringed-and less easily protected-than rights of governments.
282.
It might be suggested that the city would necessarily modify its ordinance to conform with the United States Constitution. But there is no guarantee that the city would modify it at all, much less that it would do so promptly and in full accord with proper constitutional standards.
It might also be urged that movie theater owners all have counsel who are quite familiar with decisions, like Grandco, which specially affect the industry. There may be much truth to that, but the court should not assume it in the absence of some evidentiary showing. Moreover, the wait-and-see remedial approach of Grandco would be especially harsh in cases where the litigants are not likely to have counsel or counsel with specialized knowledge. 
